State of Utah v. Jerry Perfecto Sisneros, JR. : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1999
State of Utah v. Jerry Perfecto Sisneros, JR. : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorney general; Attorney for Appellee.
Stephanie Ames; Gustin, Christian, Skordas & Caston; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Sisneros, No. 990599 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2255
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs. 
JERRY PERFECTO SISNEROS, JR. 
Defendant/Appellant 
CASENO.990599-CA 
Priority No. 2 
APPELLANT'S AMENDED BRIEF 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for Forgery, a third degree felony in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, before the Honorable Roger A. Livingston. 
STEPHANIE AMES, #6466 
GUSTIN, CHRISTIAN, SKORDAS, 
& CASTON, L.L.C. 
Boston Building, Suite 810 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber M.Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorney for Appellee 
IN INI- UI'AHCOUR'l < >|< API'hAl.S 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff7Appellee 
vs. 
JERRY PERFECTO SISNEROS, JR. 
Defendant/Appellant 
: t ASLNO -WOSW-iA 
Priority No. 2 
APPELLANT'S AMENDED BRIEF 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for Forgery, a third degree felony in violation of 
Utahl'odi \nn s /(>h-S()| UMIH I hu<I Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, before the Honorable Roger A. Livingston. 
STEPHANIE AMES, #6466 
GUSTIN, CHRISTIAN, SKORDAS, 
& CASTON, L.L.C. 
Boston Building, Suite 810 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorney for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY 
RULING THAT THE LANGUAGE IN UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-13-6 (1995^ 
PREVENTS THE COURT FROM REVIEWING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO WITHDRAW ON THE MERITS. 7 
A. The Thirty Day Time Limit in Section 77-13-6(2)(b) Should Be 
Interpreted to Run from the Date Sentencing and Final Judgment 
Are Entered Rather from the Date of The Plea Proceeding 8 
B. This Court Has Effectively Overruled Price. Finding That Such 
Time Limitations Are Not Jurisdictional 12 
POINT II. DEFENDANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL WHERE TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO FILE DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA 16 
A. Defendant's Trial Counsel Rendered Deficient Performance Which 
Fell below an Objective Standard of Reasonable Professional Judgment 17 
B. The Deficient Performance of Defendant's Trial Counsel Prejudiced 
Defendant 19 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO STRTCTLY 
COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 11 OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN CONDUCTING THE PLEA COLLOOUY 
WITH DEFENDANT. 20 
CONCLUSION 23 
TAELF OF AUTHORITIES 
PAGE 
CASES 
American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom. 689 P.2d 1,3 8 
Utah App. 1984 
Andrus v. Alined. 404 P.2d 972. 974 9 
Utah App. 1965 
Bgnneville Pilling v, Whatley, 949 P.2d 768,771 . . .71 
Utah App. 1997 
Cullym y, Farmers Ins, Exchange, 857 P.2d 922,924 9 
Utah App. 1993 
Evittsy,Lucey,469U.S. 387(1985) 18 
Holv Trinity Church v. United States. 143 U.S. 457 9 
(1892) 
James v. Galetka. 965 P.2d 567 6,12,13,14,15,16 
Utah App. 1998 
Johnson v. State Tax Com'n. 411 P.2d 831, 832 12 
Utah App. 1966 
McGowin v. McGowin. 165 So. 274,275 13 
Fla. App. 1936 
Millet v. Clark Clinic Corp.. 609 P.2d 934,936 9 
Utah App. 1980 
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers. 414 U.S. 453,458 9 
Utah App. 1974 
Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516. OJtah 1994^ 17 
Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp.. 911 P.2d 1290.1292 9 
Utah App. 1892 
i i 
Robinson v. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Com'n. 932 P.2d 1120.1123 13 
Oik. App. 1997 
State v. Benvenuto. 983 P.2d 556. 558 2 
(Utah 1999) 
State v. Chacon. 962 P.2d 45. (Utah 1998^ 17 
Utah App. 1998 
Salt Lake Citv v. Salt Lake County. 568 P.2d 738. 741 9 
Utah App. 1977 
State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 20 
(Utah 1993) 
State v. Gallegos. 738 P.2d 1040.1042 i l 
Utah APP-1987 
State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309 at 1313 22 
(Utah 1987) 
State v.Holland. 921 P.2d 430 18 
Utah 1996 
State v. Jennings. 875 P.2d 566. 569 11 
Utah App. 1994 
State v. Jones. 735 P.2d 399.420 9 , 
Utah App. 1987 
State v. Maestas. 367 Utah Adv. Rep. 15,17 2,14,15, 16,17,19 
Utah App. 1999 
< 
State v. Maguire. 529 P.2d 421 18 
Utah 1974 
State v. Ostler. 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 20, 22 
(Ut. Crt. App. 2000) , 
State v.Pierce. 782 P.2d 1994 12,14 
Utah App. 1989 
State v. Price. 837 P.2d 578 5,7,9,10,12,13,14,16
 i 
Utah App. 1992 
i i i 
1 
State v.Templin. 805 P.2d 182,186-87. 16 
Utah 1990 
State ytThwman, 846 P.2d 1256 .15 
Utah 1993 
State of Nev. v. Watkins. 914 F.2d 1545 14 
9th Cir. 1990 
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668.698 16 
1984 
United States v. Jones. 18 P. 233,236, 5 Utah 552 10 
1888 
United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns. 310 U.S. 534, 543 10,11 
Utah App. 1940 
United States v. Ron Pair Enter. 489 U.S. 235,242 9 
Utah App. 1989 
STATUTES. RULE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const, amend. VI 14 
Constitution of Utah. Article I. Section 12 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 2,3 
Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6 2,3,4,5,6,10,11,13,14,17,18 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3. 1 
Rule 11. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 2,3 
Rule 22. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 5, 11, 14 
Rule 24. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 6 
Rule 4. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 11 
Rule 48. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 11 
i v 
Rule 1.2. Rules of Professional Conduct 16 
Rule 1.3. Rules of Professional Conduct 16 
i 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
VS. ' 
JERRY PERFECTO SISNEROS, JR. 
Defendant/Appellant : 
CASENO.990599-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this third degree felony conviction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996) and Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2)(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the court was without jurisdiction to hear 
Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Standard of Review: Jurisdiction is a question of law. The standard of review is a correction-
of-error standard, giving no deference to the trial court. Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 
768,771 (Utah App. 1997). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved by Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea. (R. at 37-
42). 
Issue: Whether Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel 
did not timely file Defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
Standard of Review and Preservation: When an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
raised for the first time on direct appeal, it should be determined as a matter of law where the record 
is sufficient to determine the issue. State v. Maestas. 367 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 17 (Utah 1999). 
Issue: Whether trial court accepted Defendant's guilty pleas in violation of Defendant's due 
process rights under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, and Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. ^ 
Standard of Review: The question of whether the trial court strictly complied with 
constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Benvenuto. 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) (quoting State v. 
Holland. 921 P.2d 430,433 (Utah 1996)). The appellate court can review Defendant's guilty plea 
for plain error. State v. Ostler. 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (Ut. Crt. App. 2000) 
Preservation: This issue was preserved by Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea. (R. at 37-
42). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution (1896): 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. • 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1995): 
i 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and 
with leave of the court, 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion and shall be 
made within 30 days after the entry of the plea. < 
2 
i 
(3) This section does not restrict the right of an imprisoned person under Rule 65B, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Addendum A). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 1, 1999, Defendant pled guilty to one count of Forgery, a third degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501, before the Honorable Roger A. Livingston. (April 1,1999 
Transcript "Trl" at 6-7). Defendant was sentenced before the Honorable Sandra Peuler on May 10, 
1999. (May 10,1999 Transcript "Tr2" at 5-6). Defendant by and through counsel filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea on June 2,1999. (R. at 37-38). Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea was heard and denied before the Honorable Roger A. Livingston on June 18,1999. (June 18, 
1999 Transcript "Tr3" at 13). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 1, 1999, Defendant pled guilty to one count of Forgery, a third degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501, before the Honorable Roger A. Livingston. (Trl at 6-7). 
At the time of plea the Defendant was represented by counsel, Jeff Hall. The judge asked Mr. Hall 
whether he felt the plea was being made voluntarily, to which Mr. Hall stated," Yes, hour Honor. 
I concur in his decision to enter that plea." (Trl at page 6, line 3-4). During the ensuing plea 
colloquy the judge advised the Defendant that he was giving up the presumption of innocence, the 
privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront and cross-examine any witness called 
to testify against him. (Trl at page 4, line 7-10). The judge also advised the Defendant that he was 
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giving up the right to have a trial and to appeal the verdict to a higher court if convicted. (Trl at page 
4, line 2-4). The Defendant was not advised of his right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses. 
The judge advised the Defendant of the charge to which he was pleading and the fact that the 
state would no longer need to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Trl at page 3, line 21-25). 
The Court did not discuss the nature and elements of the offense on the record. The Court also did 
not discuss on the record any factual basis for the plea. The judge advised the Defendant of the 
minimum and maximum sentence. (Trl at page 4, line 20-24). The judge also advised the Defendant 
of the maximum possible fine and mandatory restitution. (Trl at page 5, line 7-16). The terms of 
the plea agreement were entered on the record by the prosecutor Gregory Bown. (Trl at page 2, line 
13-17). The Defendant was not advised of the time limit for filing any motion to withdraw his plea. 
Further, an affidavit was used and the Court did not establish on the record that the Defendant 
had read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the affidavit. The Court did discuss with 
the Defendant that the Defendant's attorney assured the Court that the Defendant had carefully 
reviewed the document entitled "Statement of Defendant." The Court asked the Defendant if that 
was correct and he answered "yes." (Trl at page 3, line 14-17). The Court also established that the 
Defendant could read and understand English. (Trl at page 6, line 5-7). 
On April 27,1999, Defendant informed his defense counsel of the Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association ("LDA"), that he desired to withdraw his guilty plea. (Tr3 at 5-6). Because defense 
counsel received this message from Defendant only hours before he was scheduled to leave town, 
counsel sent a letter to Defendant, who was in the county jail, stating that he was not able to file a 
motion to withdraw the guilty plea on his behalf before the 30-day time limit. Defense counsel then 
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left town. The letter in sum stated that Defendant should fill out the enclosed pro se Motion to 
Withdraw the guilty plea and send it to the court before the statutory period of withdrawal had 
lapsed. (Tr3at6-7). 
Defense counsel's letter never arrived to Defendant at the Salt Lake County Jail. The mail 
room in the Salt Lake County Jail mistakenly noted on the envelope that Defendant had been 
released and it was returned to LDA. The letter was returned to LDA unopened on May 18,1999. 
(R. at 39-40). Thus Defendant never received the advice to file on his own behalf, with the result 
that neither he nor his attorney filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea within the 30-day time 
limit. (Tr3at7-ll). 
On May 10, 1999, Defendant was sentenced before the Honorable Sandra N. Pueler. (Tr2 
at 5-6). Defendant, by and through his counsel, then filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on 
June 2, 1999. (R. at 37-38). The trial court, the Honorable Roger A. Livingston presiding, heard 
and denied Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, not on the merits of the withdrawal but on the 
basis that the time limit as set out in Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1995) left the trial court without 
jurisdiction over the matter. (Tr3 at 1-3,13) 
Defendant now appeals the court's denial to review Defendant's motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea on the merits. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. The trial court committed reversible error by ruling that the language in Utah Code Ann. § 
77-13-6 (1995) prevents the court from reviewing Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea on the 
merits. This Court in State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1992), ruled that the §77-13-6 thirty-
5 
day time limit in which a Defendant has to withdraw a guilty plea is jurisdictional. Such a ruling 
deprives the trial court of complete jurisdiction over the matter before it. It deprives the trial court 
of the ability to rule on what might otherwise be a meritorious claim, even though a Defendant has 
not been sentenced on the plea he or she has entered. Subsequently, the ruling in Price, that the 
statute is jurisdictional, was effectively overruled by this Court in James v. Galetka 965 P.2d 567 
(Utah App. 1998). This Court in James ruled that criminal statutes of limitation are not 
jurisdictional. 
II. Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant notified his attorney before 
the 30-day time limit that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea. A plea is in the sole discretion of 
a Defendant, so whether a Defendant's attorney agrees or not with the plea, the attorney is 
responsible for advocating his client's desires in such a matter. But for the attorney's actions in not 
filing a motion to withdraw Defendant's guilty plea, Defendant would have had the opportunity to 
have his motion to withdraw heard on the merits rather than summarily dismissed on jurisdictional 
grounds. 
III. The trial court erred in failing to strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure in conducting the plea colloquy with Defendant. Further, in 
incorporating the "Statement of Defendant" as an affidavit to assist with the taking of the plea, the 
trial judge failed to review with the Defendant whether the Defendant had read, understood, and 
acknowledged the contents of the affidavit. These errors made by the trial court constitute plain error 
which prejudiced the Defendant by not fully informing him of the consequences of the plea and, 
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therefore, his plea could not be considered knowing and voluntary. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY RULING THAT THE 
LANQVAQE IN UTAH CQDE ANN. § 77-13-6 (199$) PREVENTS THE COURT FRQM 
REVIEWING Defendant's MOTION TO WITHDRAW ON THE MERITS. 
The trial court committed reversible error by ruling that the language of Utah Code Ann. §77-
13-6 (1995) prevents the court from reviewing Defendant's motion to withdraw on the merits. The 
applicable code subsection reads: 
(2)(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion and shall 
be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
The trial court understood this to provision to mean that Defendant could not withdraw his guilty 
plea after thirty days had passed from the day he stood before the court and pled guilty to a criminal 
charge. The trial court should have understood this to mean that Defendant could not withdraw his 
plea after thirty days from the time his plea is entered in the records of the court as a conviction and 
final judgment. 
The trial court followed this Court's ruling in State v. Price. 837 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1992) 
which states that Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 is jurisdictional and thus filing a motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea after the 30-day time limit deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to hear a motion to 
withdraw a plea. The impact of this holding is that a trial judge, who otherwise has jurisdiction over 
the entire matter, cannot hear a meritorious motion to withdraw a plea if it is filed 30 or more days 
after a plea hearing even if it is filed before sentencing. Rule 22(a) of the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure requires a trial judge to sentence a Defendant within 45 days after a verdict or plea. This 
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time can even be extended with the agreement of the Defendant. Thus, as in this case, the 30-day 
time limit to withdraw a plea as understood by the courts had lapsed even before Defendant was 
sentenced. Such an interpretation deprived the trial court of complete jurisdiction over the matter 
from May 1,1999 to the entry of final judgment on May 12,1999. Thus there was a jurisdictional 
void as the trial court purportedly had no jurisdiction over the issue and the appellate court could not 
yet assume jurisdiction. 
A. The Thirty Dav Time Limit in Section 77-13-6(2)(b) Should Be Interpreted 
to Run from the Date Sentencing and Final Judgment Are Entered Rather 
from the Date of The Plea Proceeding. 
The thirty-day time limit imposed by Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) should be interpreted 
to run from the date sentencing and final judgment are entered. It should be only at that point that 
the clock begins to run. Similarly, at the time of final judgment, the clock begins to run in which a 
Defendant can make a motion for a new trial. Utah R. Crim. P. 24. The Language in Rule 24 is ' 
clear and unambiguous as to when the clock starts. Rule 24(c) provides, "A motion for a new trial 
shall be made within 10 days after imposition of sentence, or within such further time as the court 
( 
may fix during the ten-day period." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) has language saying that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
"shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea." This language is ambiguous as to whether j 
the clock starts ticking after a plea hearing or after the plea is entered as a final judgment. As the 
language in §77-13-6(2)(b) is ambiguous and produces nonsensical results, this Court should turn 
i 
to the legislative history to ascertain its legislative intent. In American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom. 689 
P.2d 1,3 (Utah 1984) the Supreme Court stated, "This Court's primary responsibility in construing 
legislation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature." The Court also stated: < 
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The fundamental consideration which transcends all others in regard to the 
interpretation and application of a statute is: What was the intent of the Legislature? 
. . . All other rules of statutory construction are subordinate to it and are helpful only 
insofar as they assist in attaining that objective. In determining that intent the statute 
should be considered in light of the purpose it was designed to serve and so applied 
as to carry out that purpose if it can be done consistent with its language. 
Johnson v. State Tax Com'n. 411 P.2d 831, 832 (Utah 1966 :^ accord Salt Lake Citv v. Salt Lake 
County, 568 P.2d 738,741 (Utah 1977); Cullum v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 857 P.2d 922,924 (Utah 
1993). 
In fact, the literal language must give way to the intent of the legislature in passing the 
statute: 
"One of the fundamental rules of statutory construction is that the statute should be 
looked at as a whole and in light of the general purpose it was intended to serve; and 
should be so interpreted and applied as to accomplish that objective. In order to give 
the statute the implementation which will fulfill its purpose, reason and intention 
sometimes prevail over technically applied literalness." 
State v. Jones. 735 P.2d 399,420 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting Andrus v. Allred. 404 P.2d 972, 974 
(Utah 1965)). 
While ordinarily courts will interpret statutes according to their plain language, courts will 
go behind the plain language where "such reading is confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention 
of the express purpose of the statute." Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp.. 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 
(Utah 1996); see also Holv Trinity Chruch v. Untied States. 143 U.S. 457,459 (1892)(rejecting plain 
language of a statute in order to effectuate legislative intent); United States v. Ron Pair Enter. Inc.. 
489 U.S. 235,242 (1989); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers. 414 
U.S. 453,458 (1974). Our Supreme Court has further stated that statutory interpretations are to be 
avoided "which render some part of the provision nonsensical or absurd." Millet v. Clark Clinic 
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Corp.. 609 P.2d 934,936 (Utah 1980). The United States Supreme Court has gone even further in 
its reasoning: 
Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but 
merely an unreasonable one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as 
a whole'.. . this Court has followed that purpose rather than the literal words . . . 
When an aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is 
available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use . . . however 
clear the words may appear in 'superficial examination.' 
United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns. 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (footnotes and citations 
omitted). 
The Utah Legislature intended this statute to prevent convicts from waiting for several 
months or years before making a motion to withdraw their guilty pleas. The legislature also intended 
that the 30-day limitation to withdraw a guilty plea begin only after final judgment has been entered. 
Senator Richard J. Carling, sponsor of the bill, stated in senate debates, "In order to be fair to both 
the Defendant and to the state, this bill has been presented which would indicate that a person may 
withdraw their guilty plea only within 30 days after they entered that plea and there has been a final 
disposition . . . " Senate Debate, January 24, 1989 (Senate Bill 81), emphasis added. Thus the ' 
purpose of the bill is not to deprive a Defendant the ability to withdraw a guilty plea even before he 
is sentenced. It is rather to prevent convicted prisoners from withdrawing their pleas months or years 
i 
after conviction, when evidence is stale and a retrial is almost impossible. (See Senate Debate, 
Senate Bill 81, Addendum B). One of the major forces behind the passing of this bill, besides the 
State-Wide Association of Prosecutors, was the Utah State Prison. (See House Debate, Senate Bill \ 
81, Addendum B). This further adds strength to the argument that the purpose of the legislation is 
to curb convict motions to withdraw guilty pleas, not to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over 
10 
i 
a criminal matter presently before it. 
Furthermore, one of the stated legislative purposes was to be fair to both the Defendant and 
the state. Giving a Defendant a bright line rule of how long he has to withdraw a guilty plea 
certainly has an element of fairness. The current application of the timing, however, is neither fair 
to the Defendant nor the state. The current application of section 77-13-6 deprives a trial court of 
complete jurisdiction over a matter before it. It also often deprives a Defendant the ability to move 
to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing and final disposition of the matter which is exactly 
opposite of what the Utah Courts have established. In State v. Gallegos. 738 P.2d 1040,1042 (Utah 
1987) the Utah Supreme Court Directed that "a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should, 
in general, be liberally granted." (See also State v. Jennings. 875 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah App. 1994) 
issued after Price, reaffirming the notion that presentence motions should be granted liberally). 
The Price jurisdictional application of the 30-day rule precludes a trial judge from exercising 
discretion as to whether a delay in submitting a motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be heard 
because of excusable neglect or other extenuating circumstances. In a case such as Defendant's, 
where the 30-day time limit expired before he was even sentenced, the only recourse he had was to 
wait to be sentenced and for the final judgment to be entered and then follow the appellate route for 
what could have been an obvious and easily remedied issue at the trial court level. This results in 
an unfair and unworkable system which will allow unconstitutional and illegal pleas to remain in 
place even though a Defendant moved to withdraw the plea before judgment was entered. 
Even though the language of the statute may appear clear upon a superficial glance, it is 
"plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole" producing a result the legislature 
could not have intended. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns. 310 U.S. at 543. The 
11 
legislature intended the 30-day limit to begin only when final judgment on a plea has been entered, 
not from the day of the plea hearing. 
Therefore, Defendant respectfully requests this Court to look beyond the language of the 
statute in § 77-13-6 to the legislative intent and find that the purpose of the statute is to limit 
withdrawal of a guilty plea to within 30 days after a plea is entered as a final judgment. Such a 
finding comports with the legislative purpose of the statute and still fits within the statute's language 
as required in Johnson v. State Tax Com'n. 411 P.2d at 832. &* 
B. This CQurt Has Effectively Overruled Pricg, Finding Thgt $\iph Time ^ - —• 
Limitations Are NQt Jurisdictional 
The time limitation in which a criminal Defendant may withdraw his guilty plea as imposed 
by Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(b) is not jurisdictional. This Court ruled in State v. Price, 837 P.2d 
578 (Utah App. 1992) that the 30-day limitation imposed by this statute is jurisdictional. Such a 
ruling contradicts the very notions of jurisdiction. When a court has jurisdiction over a case, it has 
jurisdiction to hear all matters relating to that controversy. In the dissenting opinion of United States 
v. Jones. 18 p. 233, 236, 5 Utah 552 (Utah 1888) Chief Justice Zane gave an eloquent description 
of what constitutes jurisdiction. He said: 
The jurisdiction of a court consists of its lawful authority to act as a court. The 
jurisdiction ofa court embraces all the discretion it may lawfully exercise, and every i 
decision and order it may lawfully make, every writ that it issues and every judgment 
that it pronounces. The jurisdiction of a court, the authority of a court and the powers 
of a court are synonymous terms. Their legal meaning is the same...In the case of 
Hopkins v. Com., 3 Mete. 460, the supreme court of Massachusetts, SHAW, C.J. 
delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The word 'jurisdiction' Qus dicere) is a
 { 
term of large and comprehensive import and embraces every kind of judicial action 
upon the subject-matter, from finding the indictment to pronouncing the sentence ... 
To have jurisdiction is to have power to inquire into the facts, to apply the law, and 
to declare the punishment in a regular course of judicial proceeding." 
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The Supreme Court of Florida added to this very statement by saying, "'Jurisdiction' . . . 
embraces every kind of judicial action touching the subject of the action, suit, petition, complaint, 
indictment, or other proceeding." Robinson v. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Com'n. 932 P.2d 1120, 
1123 (Okl. 1997) (quoting McGowin v. McGowin. 165 So. 274,275 (Fla. 1936)). It is inconsistent 
with the principles of jurisdiction for a court to have jurisdiction over a case but not have jurisdiction 
to hear a motion concerning the case and decide if it is meritorious. 
The Price ruling, that the statute in question is jurisdictional, simply does not fit well in the 
procedural scheme. Applying Price to other rules of criminal procedure leads to absurd results. Its 
logical conclusion would render other rules of criminal procedure such as Rule 22 jurisdictional as 
well. Rule 22 requires the trial court impose sentencing within 45 days of a guilty plea or finding 
of guilt. If the trial court failed to impose sentencing until day 46, assuming the Defendant did not 
consent to the delay, then the trial court would be without jurisdiction over the Defendant and could 
never impose sentencing if it followed the Price ruling. Such a finding would produce nonsensical 
and absurd results, clearly outside the purpose of the statute. The Price Court noted that Rules 4 and 
48 of the Utah Rules of Appellate procedure are jurisdictional. These Rules give the time lines for 
filing for an appeal of right and for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari, respectively. These two 
rules differ significantly from Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(b). These rules set a time limit for which 
jurisdiction of an appellate court will remain over an entire matter if no action is taken to extend it 
further. If these time limits expire, then the appellate courts no longer have jurisdiction over any 
portion of the matter as an appellate body. The time limit in §77-13-6(2)(b) as interpreted in Price, 
unlike these other rules, does not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the entire matter. Rather it 
deprives the court of "jurisdiction" over a portion of a matter. 
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The idea that judicial jurisdiction can be compartmentalized, meaning that a court has 
jurisdiction over only parts of a matter, runs afoul the very notions of jurisdiction. While it is 
recognized that governments can have proportional jurisdiction over land, judicial jurisdiction over 
a matter is not really comparable. (See State of Nev. v. Watkins. 914 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1990) as 
an example 6f split governmental jurisdiction over land.) Either a court has jurisdiction over a 
matter or it does not. 
This court has effectively overruled its jurisdictional position on time limitations in criminal 
matters, as established in Price. In James v. Galetka. 965 P.2d 567 (Utah App. 1998) this court 
addressed the issue as to whether statutes of limitation in criminal matters are jurisdictional and thus 
cannot be waived. The specific issue was whether a criminal Defendant could plead to a crime when 
the statute of limitation governing the specific crime had passed. This Court stated that a Defendant 
can waive a statute of limitations and plead to a crime even though the time has since passed in 
which he could be prosecuted for such a crime. Thus this Court ruled that criminal statutes of 
limitation are not jurisdictional and thus can be waived. In a James type situation, the statute of 
limitations can be waived by a Defendant whereas the statute runs for the benefit of the Defendant. 
Thus where a criminal statute of limitation runs for the benefit of the court, the court should be able 
to waive the limitation. The dissent in James correctly points out that contrary to the majority's 
opinion, the issue of deciding whether criminal statutes of limitation are jurisdictional was not an 
issue of first impression. The dissent notes that in Price and State v. Pierce. 782 P.2d 1994 (Utah 
App. 1989) this Court ruled that such statutes were jurisdictional and thus the James opinion "at a 
minimum, [is] inconsistent with prior decisions of this court." James 965 P.2d at 575. 
As this court most recently ruled that criminal statutes of limitation are not jurisdictional, the 
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trial court erred in following the Price ruling. Thus the trial court was not deprived of jurisdiction 
over the matter of Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court, not lacking 
jurisdiction, had the authority to waive the 30-day limitation imposed by section 77-13-6(2)(b). The 
trial court had the authority to decide if there was an excusable reason for Defendant having missed 
the 30-day time limit and if so, to hear the motion on the merits. 
This Court has a duty to follow its most recent decision on the issue of criminal statutes of 
limitation. In State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256,1269 (Utah 1993) the Supreme Court said that stare 
decisis has application, not only "when a single-panel appellate court is face with a prior decision 
from the same court," but "has equal application when one panel of a multi-panel appellate court is 
faced with a prior decision of a different panel." Price was decided by one appellate court panel and 
James was decided by another save one judge. Such could account for the inconsistencies between 
the two decisions. Whether the inconsistent decisions were due to the composition of the court, the 
James Court nevertheless effectively overruled Price, thus James is now the law regarding criminal 
statutes of limitation. This Court now has a duty to apply the doctrine of stare decisis and follow its 
ruling in James by ruling and clarifying that the 30-day criminal statute of limitation found in Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) is not jurisdictional, thus can be waived. Failure to apply the doctrine 
of stare decisis "would produce unacceptable indeterminacy in the law and would undermine 
confidence in its institutions. If stare decisis had no application to a multi-panel court such as the 
court of appeals, it would sanction a judicial system under which the outcome of an appeal 
presenting a particular legal question would be dependant more on the composition of the panel 
hearing the case than on whether the issue has been previously addressed and decided by that court." 
State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1269. 
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The issue of whether criminal statutes of limitation are jurisdictional has most recently been 
decided in James v. Galetka by this Court and found to not be jurisdictional. Therefore, Defendant 
in this matter respectfully requests that this Court apply the doctrine of stare decisis, remand this 
case, ruling that Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(b) is not jurisdictional and thus the trial court was not 
without jurisdiction to decide whether it should hear Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
II. Defendant RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHERETRIAL 
COUNSEL FAILED TQ FILE Defendant's MOTION TQ WITHDRAW HIS QUILTY PLEA 
Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney failed to file a 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea within the requisite time period. The Sixth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah guarantee effective 
assistance of counsel to an individual who is accused of a crime which may result in imprisonment. 
See Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984); State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186-87 
(Utah 1990). The Standard of review for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is that if the 
Defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal, and the record is sufficient to review the issue, 
then the appellate court shall review the issue as a matter of law. State v. Maestas. 367 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 15,17 (Utah 1999). 
Where a Defendant claims he has received ineffective assistance of counsel, he must establish 
"that his 'counsel rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment; and that 'counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him.' To 
do this, a Defendant "must 'identify specific acts or omissions that fell outside the wide range or 
professional assistance and illustrate that absent those acts or omissions, there is a 'reasonable 
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probability' of a more favorable result.'" State v. Maestas. 367 Utah Adv. Rep. 15,17 (Utah 1999) 
(quoting State v. Chacon. 962 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah 1998) (quoting Parsons Vt Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 
522 (Utah 1994))). 
Defendant communicated to his trial attorney about three days before the 30-day time limit 
expired to withdraw a guilty plea that he desired to withdraw his guilty plea. (Tr3 at 5-6). 
Defendant's attorney received this message from Defendant only a short time before Defense 
Counsel was scheduled to leave town for a conference. In response, Defendant's attorney sent a 
letter instructing Defendant to file a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Due to a clerical error 
at the Salt Lake County Jail where Defendant was housed, Defendant did not receive the letter. (Tr3 
at 7-8 and R. at 39-40) The letter was returned to LDA unopened after the statutory 30 time period 
to withdraw a guilty plea had lapsed. (R. at 39-40). As a result, Defendant's motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea was not filed until after the 30-day time limit had expired. (R. at 37-38). 
A. Defendant's Trial Counsel Rendered Deficient Performance Which Fell below an 
Objective Standard of Reasonable Professional Judgment 
Defendant's trial attorney, by instructing Defendant to file a pro se motion rather than filing 
the motion on behalf of Defendant and by mailing such a response to Defendant when the time 
limitation was fast approaching, demonstrates counsel's deficient performance which fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment. 
The Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2(a) state that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's 
decisions concerning the objectives of representation... a lawyer shall abide by the client' decision, 
after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether 
the client will testify." A plea in a criminal matter "must be considered a prerogative of an accused," 
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thus it was solely Defendant's choice as to whether he would make a motion to withdraw his plea. 
State v. Maguire. 529 P.2d 421,422 (Utah 1974). This does not mean that a lawyer is to be a mere 
pawn in the hands of his client; the means to the objectives are within the prerogative of the attorney 
but the objectives remain the prerogative of the client. (See Rule 1.2, Comment, Scope of 
Representation and Rule 1.3, Comment). As such, a diligent attorney, exercising reasonable, 
professional judgment, would have filed Defendant's motion to withdraw within the statutory time 
frame. 
Attorney diligence should be part of the objective standard of the professional judgment 
element. Rule 1.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct state, "A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client." Professional prudence should demonstrate that 
this rule does not allow the lawyer to limit the scope of representation in a criminal matter to 
something such as, "I will represent you in defense of this matter so long as it does not 
inconvenience me." In fact the Comment for Rule 1.3 states: 
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or 
personal inconvenience to the lawyer . . . A lawyer should act with commitment and 
dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf. 
Emphasis added. 
In State v.Holland, 921 P.2d 430,435 (Utah 1996) the Supreme Court said, "To be effective, 
an attorney 'must play the role of an active advocate, rather than a mere friend of the court.'" 
Furthermore, "[u]nless an attorney represents the interests of a client with zeal and loyalty, the 
adversarial system of justice cannot operate." (Quoting Evitts v. Lucey. 469 U.S. 387 (1985)). 
Defendant's trial counsel rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment. Defendant's counsel failed to represent Defendant's 
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interest with the reasonable diligence and zeal required under the standard of professional behavior 
prescribed by the Utah Supreme Court. Defendant's trial counsel rendered deficient performance 
by failing to recognize that his representation of the client was not limited in any manner based upon 
counsel's inconveniences and by failing to recognize that whether or not the withdrawing of a guilty 
is a wise strategy, the plea is always within the prerogative of the Defendant. 
B. The Deficient Performance of Defendant's Trial Counsel Prejudiced Defendant 
The deficient performance of Defendant's trial counsel prejudiced Defendant. But for such 
deficient performance, not only is there a reasonable probability, but there is a 100% probability that 
Defendant would have had the opportunity for his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to be heard on 
the merits. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) states that a request to withdraw a guilty plea is made by 
motion. Subsection (a) states that a guilty plea may be withdrawn only upon showing "good cause" 
and with leave of the court. Therefore, if a motion to withdraw a plea is timely made, there will be, 
as a matter of course, a hearing to determine whether there is "good cause." Due to the ineffective 
assistance of counsel Defendant received at the trial court level, Defendant was denied the 
opportunity to file a motion and to present "good cause" as to why his plea should be withdrawn. 
For Defendant, having his motion heard on the merits would have undoubtedly been a "more 
favorable result." Maestas. 367 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17. 
As Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel as the trial level, and he was 
prejudiced by such ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court 
remand this case to the trial court, giving Defendant an opportunity to file a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea and have that motion heard on its merits. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ERREP IN FAILING TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH THE 
REQUIREMENTS QF RULE 11 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
IN CONDUCTING THE PLEA COLLOQUY WITH Defendant, 
The trial court failed to strictly comply with the rules of criminal procedure in conducting 
the plea colloquy with Defendant. Further, in incorporating the "Statement of Defendant" as an 
affidavit to assist with the taking of the plea, the trial judge failed to review with the Defendant 
whether the Defendant had read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the affidavit. These 
errors made by the trial court constitute plain error which prejudiced the Defendant by not fully 
informing him of the consequences of the plea and, therefore, his plea could not be considered 
voluntary. 
The Utah Court of Appeals held in its recent decision of State v. Ostler. 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 
43 (Ut. Crt. App. 2000) that even if Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea is untimely, the court 
can review the guilty plea for plain error. To succeed on a claim of plain error, a Defendant has the 
burden of showing "(0 an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and 
(iii) the error is harmful." 14 at 6, quoting State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
In this case, numerous errors exist in the Court's failure to advise the Defendant and in its 
failure to review with the Defendant whether he read, understood, and agreed with the written 
affidavit. At the time of plea the Defendant was represented by counsel, Jeff Hall. The judge asked 
Mr. Hall whether he felt the plea was being made voluntarily, to which Mr. Hall stated," Yes, your 
Honor. I concur in his decision to enter that plea." (Trl at page 6, line 3-4). During the ensuing 
plea colloquy the judge advised the Defendant that he was giving up the presumption of innocence, 
the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront and cross-examine any witness 
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called to testify against him. (Trl at page 4, line 7-10). The judge also advised the Defendant that 
he was giving up the right to have a trial and to appeal the verdict to a higher court if convicted. (Trl 
at page 4, line 2-4). The Defendant was not advised of his right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses. 
The judge advised the Defendant of the charge to which he was pleading and the fact that the 
state would no longer need to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Trl at page 3, line 21-25). 
The Court did not discuss the nature and elements of the offense on the record. The Court also did 
not discuss on the record any factual basis for the plea. The judge advised the Defendant of the 
minimum and maximum sentence. (Trl at page 4, line 20-24). The judge also advised the Defendant 
of the maximum possible fine and mandatory restitution. (Trl at page 5, line 7-16). The terms of 
the plea agreement were entered on the record by the prosecutor Gregory Bown. (Trl at page 2, line 
13-17). The Defendant was not advised of the time limit for filing any motion to withdraw his plea. 
Further, an affidavit was used and the Court did not establish on the record that the Defendant 
had read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the affidavit. The Court did discuss with 
the Defendant the fact that the Defendant's attorney assured the Court that the Defendant had 
carefully reviewed the document entitled "Statement of Defendant." The Court asked the Defendant 
if that was correct and he answered "yes." (Trl at page 3, line 14-17). The Court also established that 
the Defendant could read and understand English. (Trl at page 6, line 5-7). This colloquy does not 
strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Accordingly, the trial court committed plain error by failing to protect the Defendant's procedural 
and constitutional rights when it did not cover all of the Defendant's rights during the colloquy. 
Further, the trial court did not fully incorporate the terms of the written affidavit into the 
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colloquy. In State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309 at 1313 (Utah 1987) the Utah Supreme Court 
sanctioned the use of written affidavits as an efficient means to comply with Rule 11. However, in 
order to be considered sufficient for strict compliance, the trial judge should review the statements 
in the affidavit with the Defendant, question the Defendant concerning his understanding of it, and 
fulfill the other requirements imposed by Rule 11(e) on the record before accepting the guilty plea. 
Id. at 1313-1314. The court in Gibbons recognized that, although "this procedure may take 
additional time," a Defendant's "constitutional rights may not be sacrificed in the name of judicial 
economy." 14 at 1314. 
In this case the Court did not review with the Defendant whether he had read and understood 
the terms contained in the affidavit. He asked the Defendant if his attorney's representation was 
correct; that the Defendant had reviewed the affidavit and he confirmed that the Defendant read and 
understood English. This is not sufficient to strictly comply with Gibbons or Rule 11. Accordingly, 
error exists in the trial court's acceptance of the Defendant's plea. 
Regarding the second requirement for plain error, as stated by the Court of Appeals in Ostler, 
considering the number of cases addressing Rule 11, it should be obvious to a trial court what those 
requirements are. The fact the they were never discussed with the Defendant on the record 
constitutes plain error. State v. Ostler. 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 at 19. 
Regarding the third requirement for plain error, the error must be harmful. By failing to fully 
advise the Defendant of his rights, the plea was not voluntary or knowing and, therefore, prejudiced 
the Defendant. "Because a guilty plea cannot be voluntary if it is uninformed, Defendant's guilty 
plea was involuntary, and therefore the trial court's error was prejudicial to Defendant." IcL At 21. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in determining it was without jurisdiction to hear Defendant's motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea on the merits. Thus Defendant respectfully requests that this Court 
remand the issue to the trial court with instructions that he be given the opportunity to have his 
motion heard on the merits. 
Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel and was prejudiced by such. But for 
Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel, he would have not been denied the opportunity to have 
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea heard on the merits. Thus Defendant respectfully requests that 
this Court remand this case back to the trial court instructing the court to allow Defendant to present 
the merits of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Finally, the trial court erred in failing to strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 11 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in conducting the plea colloquy with Defendant. Further, in 
incorporating the "Statement of Defendant" as an affidavit to assist with the taking of the plea, the 
trial judge failed to review with the Defendant whether the Defendant had read, understood, and 
acknowledged the contents of the affidavit. These errors made by the trial court constitute plain error 
which prejudiced the Defendant by not fully informing him of the consequences of the plea and, 
therefore, his plea could not be considered knowing and voluntary. 
DATED this <^ >3 day of Umnt , 2000. 
/ GUSTIM CHRISTIAN, SKORDAS & CASTON 
Stephanie Amesj/Attorney at Law 
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Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless 
the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to plead until the 
defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty 
and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of 
insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall 
enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant 
unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases other than felonies the 
court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for 
a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not 
accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to 
counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory 
self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and 
cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, 
that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged 
crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable 
to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of 
conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum 
mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea 
is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what 
agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
^ r i « f ^ g ^ y r*,011 ******>% of the defendant on the record or, if used, an affidavit 
reciting^ these factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and 
^owledged the contents of the affidavit If the defendant camot understand me English language, 
it will be sufficient that the affidavit has been read or translated to the defendant 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or advise 
concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
S i l ^ T t°+alViSe *? d e f i ? d a i l t ° f m e **» ^ fOT ^ 8 ^ motion to withdraw a plea of 
ground for extending the time to make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(£}2!f ilu151'6313 * * m? P 1 0 8 ^ ^ attorney or any other party has agreed to request or 
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me agreement shall be approved by the court S J I S f ^ t f „ ^ 0 m n a , d l T " a " ° W e d °* *e court, tte court shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court 
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S £££"£^ ^  agKement ^  ^reasons &r *• ^ « * - - of*• ^  for 
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wno prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
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m « S i r ? i * C0UrtJsha11 h o I d a h e a n n g within a reasonable time to determine if the defendant is 
mentally ill
 m accordance with Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-16a-103 defendant is 
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JERRY PERFECTO SISNEROS. , 
Defendant J 
ORDER 
Case No. 991901606 
Judge Roger A. Livingston 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Withdraw Plea is denied and the sentence is 
to remain. 
• 
DATED this /j day of March, 2000. 
BY THE CO 
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